A Critique of Robert E. Goodin's Stars to Steer By
A Critique of Robert
Goodin’s Stars to Steer By
Political Science
2200-001
Douglas College
Dayna Wilson
[300113188]
26 September 2021
Word count: 862
Oh, to live in
the world that Robert E. Goodin imagines. As Mr. Goodin sees it, the principles
of representative democracy are inherently inferior to those of oligarchical
governance. Harkening back to Platonic ideals of old, Goodin posits that rather
than basing policy decision on public opinion and collective response, elected
officials should rely instead on their own internal understanding of the
concept of ‘The Good.’ Defining said philosophical concept of Good in concrete
terms as “good (or have merit) independently of any desire that people may or
may not have for them” (243), Goodin indicates that it is the responsibility of
political elites to identify what he calls merit goods and impose them upon the
population at large whether they are in demand or not. This paternalist
approach to politics will assuredly result in the population eventually coming
to realize that policies enacted were in their best interests, which in turn
will result in the populace rewarding the policy maker with continued rewards
in the form of votes and support. As Goodin sees it, we must only elect policy
experts, what Plato would have referred to as Philosopher-Kings, and the
societal benefits will follow. Education, social programming, and cultural
immersion programs will be made freely available to citizens, and benefits will
eventually be felt by all.
From a purely
philosophical perspective, Goodin’s argument does hold merit. Should these
political elites exist and be untainted by self interest and have a holistic
grasp of what was truly ‘Good’ for society at large, it would indeed make sense
for these individuals to govern according to their will over public demand. While
Goodin himself acknowledges that his argument is elitist (256), it is
philosophically sound. The concept of select individuals holding superior
understanding of societal welfare is a comforting one, offering much the same soothing
balm of religion in knowing that our best interests are cared for by an
almighty force. Unfortunately, however, Goodin’s theories cannot be backed up
in real world practice for two distinct reasons: first of all, the subjective
nature of what can be defined as good, and secondly, the fact that politicians
who have enacted objectively “good” policies have not always been rewarded with
continued support.
Though Goodin is
quick to define what consists of a merit good, said definition remains somewhat
nebulous. Education, he maintains, is a public good. Yet the subjective nature
of curriculum cannot be overlooked. In an obvious example, Adolf Hitler would
agree with the importance of education, and subsidized elite compulsory
education to indoctrinate the population with Nazi ideology (Britannica).
Hitler, viewed predominantly as one of history’s foremost villains, undoubtedly
believed he was pursuing public benefits in providing education for all. Yet,
as we all now know, this elite state subsidized education advocated genocide,
torture, and ethnic supremacy. Another example Goodin submits as a merit good
is exposure to high culture. Yet who is to define what said high culture
consists of? Opera is suggested as an example, yet it is difficult to determine
what exactly elevates opera to the status of elite cultural art form. Here,
ethnocentrism seems to rear its ugly head, and one has to wonder whether Goodin
would just as readily advocate for access to say, a Kendrick Lamar concert as a
societal benefit. Despite being a Pulitzer Prize winning artist, Mr. Lamar’s genre
of music (rap) is not necessarily viewed as highbrow by the older white men
who, like Goodin, generally see fit to comment on political philosophy. While
the concept of an overarching theory of all that is “Good” is undoubtedly nice
to think about, in reality it is simply too subject to implicit bias to be
effectively defined.
Secondly, even assuming
that a universally accepted definition of Good could, in theory, be obtained,
it remains inaccurate to argue that a leader would undoubtedly be rewarded for
choosing to pursue and implement policy that upholds said Good. A prime example
of this can be observed in the United States, with Barack Obama’s Affordable
Care Act, colloquially dubbed “ObamaCare.” By Goodin’s own definition this
policy must objectively be considered Good, as it benefitted a great number of
Americans and thus improved the overall quality of American life, leading to
healthier, happier citizens. Yet Obama was not universally lauded for the
policy, and in fact a great number of Americans were unable to see the benefits
to society beyond their own self interest even years later. Subsequently, far
right leaning Republican candidate Donald Trump was elected over Obama’s
Democrat successor, and Republicans voted numerous times to repeal the act. This
pursuit of self interest can be viewed in democracies the world over, indicating
that contrary to the ideal that Goodin indicates is the case, pursuit of Good
is by no means a guarantee to the continued support of the electorate.
Goodin has many great
ideas, and it would surely be pleasant to live in a society led and motivated
by pure benevolence. However, his article neglects to consider the vast variety
that exists in human morality and cultural perspective. While it is a very nice
thought exercise, it remains purely theoretical, with what seems an overly
idealistic approach to practical politics.
Bibliography
Encyclopaedia Britannica. “Nazi Germany.” Accessed September
26, 2021.
https://www.britannica.com/topic/education/Nazi-Germany
Goodin, Robert E. “Stars to Steer by: The Political Impact of
Moral Values.” Journal of Public Policy 9, no.
3 (1989): 241–59. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4007439.
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