A Critique of Robert E. Goodin's Stars to Steer By

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

A Critique of Robert Goodin’s Stars to Steer By

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Political Science 2200-001

Douglas College

Dayna Wilson [300113188]

26 September 2021

Word count: 862

 

Oh, to live in the world that Robert E. Goodin imagines. As Mr. Goodin sees it, the principles of representative democracy are inherently inferior to those of oligarchical governance. Harkening back to Platonic ideals of old, Goodin posits that rather than basing policy decision on public opinion and collective response, elected officials should rely instead on their own internal understanding of the concept of ‘The Good.’ Defining said philosophical concept of Good in concrete terms as “good (or have merit) independently of any desire that people may or may not have for them” (243), Goodin indicates that it is the responsibility of political elites to identify what he calls merit goods and impose them upon the population at large whether they are in demand or not. This paternalist approach to politics will assuredly result in the population eventually coming to realize that policies enacted were in their best interests, which in turn will result in the populace rewarding the policy maker with continued rewards in the form of votes and support. As Goodin sees it, we must only elect policy experts, what Plato would have referred to as Philosopher-Kings, and the societal benefits will follow. Education, social programming, and cultural immersion programs will be made freely available to citizens, and benefits will eventually be felt by all.

From a purely philosophical perspective, Goodin’s argument does hold merit. Should these political elites exist and be untainted by self interest and have a holistic grasp of what was truly ‘Good’ for society at large, it would indeed make sense for these individuals to govern according to their will over public demand. While Goodin himself acknowledges that his argument is elitist (256), it is philosophically sound. The concept of select individuals holding superior understanding of societal welfare is a comforting one, offering much the same soothing balm of religion in knowing that our best interests are cared for by an almighty force. Unfortunately, however, Goodin’s theories cannot be backed up in real world practice for two distinct reasons: first of all, the subjective nature of what can be defined as good, and secondly, the fact that politicians who have enacted objectively “good” policies have not always been rewarded with continued support.

Though Goodin is quick to define what consists of a merit good, said definition remains somewhat nebulous. Education, he maintains, is a public good. Yet the subjective nature of curriculum cannot be overlooked. In an obvious example, Adolf Hitler would agree with the importance of education, and subsidized elite compulsory education to indoctrinate the population with Nazi ideology (Britannica). Hitler, viewed predominantly as one of history’s foremost villains, undoubtedly believed he was pursuing public benefits in providing education for all. Yet, as we all now know, this elite state subsidized education advocated genocide, torture, and ethnic supremacy. Another example Goodin submits as a merit good is exposure to high culture. Yet who is to define what said high culture consists of? Opera is suggested as an example, yet it is difficult to determine what exactly elevates opera to the status of elite cultural art form. Here, ethnocentrism seems to rear its ugly head, and one has to wonder whether Goodin would just as readily advocate for access to say, a Kendrick Lamar concert as a societal benefit. Despite being a Pulitzer Prize winning artist, Mr. Lamar’s genre of music (rap) is not necessarily viewed as highbrow by the older white men who, like Goodin, generally see fit to comment on political philosophy. While the concept of an overarching theory of all that is “Good” is undoubtedly nice to think about, in reality it is simply too subject to implicit bias to be effectively defined.  

Secondly, even assuming that a universally accepted definition of Good could, in theory, be obtained, it remains inaccurate to argue that a leader would undoubtedly be rewarded for choosing to pursue and implement policy that upholds said Good. A prime example of this can be observed in the United States, with Barack Obama’s Affordable Care Act, colloquially dubbed “ObamaCare.” By Goodin’s own definition this policy must objectively be considered Good, as it benefitted a great number of Americans and thus improved the overall quality of American life, leading to healthier, happier citizens. Yet Obama was not universally lauded for the policy, and in fact a great number of Americans were unable to see the benefits to society beyond their own self interest even years later. Subsequently, far right leaning Republican candidate Donald Trump was elected over Obama’s Democrat successor, and Republicans voted numerous times to repeal the act. This pursuit of self interest can be viewed in democracies the world over, indicating that contrary to the ideal that Goodin indicates is the case, pursuit of Good is by no means a guarantee to the continued support of the electorate.

Goodin has many great ideas, and it would surely be pleasant to live in a society led and motivated by pure benevolence. However, his article neglects to consider the vast variety that exists in human morality and cultural perspective. While it is a very nice thought exercise, it remains purely theoretical, with what seems an overly idealistic approach to practical politics.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Bibliography

Encyclopaedia Britannica. “Nazi Germany.” Accessed September 26, 2021.

https://www.britannica.com/topic/education/Nazi-Germany

Goodin, Robert E. “Stars to Steer by: The Political Impact of Moral Values.” Journal of Public Policy 9, no.

3 (1989): 241–59. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4007439.